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Fascinating -

       Federal constitutional guarantees of rights to counsel are deemed to translate as applicable to state proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment, and upon this matter the U.S. Supreme Court has offered much insight and guidance.
“In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-345 (1963), we held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to state-appointed counsel, firmly established in federal court proceedings in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), applies to state criminal prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment. We clarified the scope of that right in Argersinger, holding that an indigent defendant must be offered counsel in any misdemeanor case that actually leads to imprisonment.” 407 U.S. at 33. Seven Terms later, Scott confirmed Argersinger's “delimit[ation],” 440 U.S. at 373. Although the governing statute in Scott authorized a jail sentence of up to one year, see id. at 368, we held that the defendant had no right to state-appointed counsel because the sole sentence actually imposed on him was a $50 fine, id. at 373. “Even were the matter res nova,” we stated,
the central premise of Argersinger -- that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment -- is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel in nonfelony cases.

Ibid. Subsequent decisions have reiterated the Argersinger-Scott “actual imprisonment” standard. See, e.g., Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001) (“any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance”); M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U.S. 102, 113 (1996); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994) (constitutional line is “between criminal proceedings that resulted in imprisonment, and those that did not”); id. at 750 (SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment) (“The Court in Scott, relying on Argersinger[,] drew a bright line between imprisonment and lesser criminal penalties.”); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 26 (1981). It is thus the controlling rule that, “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense . . . unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37.”

See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 US 654 (#00-1214) (2002).

The right to counsel occupies a primary and fundamental place among those which are to be secured to the defendant in any criminal proceeding. A denial of counsel vitiates jurisdiction upon its occurrence, and any judgment rendered thereafter is utterly void.
"Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty. When this right is properly waived, the assistance of counsel is no longer a necessary element of the court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence. If the accused, however, is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty. A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost "in the course of the proceedings" due to failure to complete the court -- as the Sixth Amendment requires -- by providing counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus. A judge of the United States -- to whom a petition for habeas corpus is addressed -- should be alert to examine "the facts for himself when if true as alleged they make the trial absolutely void." See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 467-68 (1938).

The standard for rights to counsel under the Sixth Amendment set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, Id., is the benchmark for determining claims of deprivations of such right. See Stewart v. Lagrand, 526 US 115, 119 (1999); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Educ. Exp. Bd., 527 US 666, 682 (1999); U.S. v. Mezzanatto, 513 US 196, 201 (1995); Custis v. U.S., 511 US 485, 490, 494-95 (1994); Davis v. United States, 512 US 452, 469-70 (1994); U.S. v. Olano, 507 US 725, 733 (1993); Godinez v. Moran, 509 US 389, 396, 401 (1993); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 US 285, 292 (1988); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 US 523, 531 (1987); Murray v. Carrier, 477 US 478 (1986); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 US 365 (1986); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 US 625, 633 (1986); Moran v. Burbine, 475 US 412, 421 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474 US 159, 169 (1985); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 US 387, 394 (1985); US v. Gouveia, 467 US 180, 188-89 (1984); Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 684-85 (1984); Solem v. Stumes, 465 US 638, 647 (1984); Rushen v. Spain, 464 US 114, 128, and fn.7 (1983); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477-78 (1981); US v. Morrison, 449 US 361, 364 (1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 US 335, 343 (1980).

What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue.
[W]hether the defendant must participate personally in the waiver, whether certain procedures are required for waiver, and whether the defendant's choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake.

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). For certain fundamental rights, the defendant must personally make an informed waiver. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-465 (1938) (right to counsel); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966) (right to plead not guilty). For other rights, however, waiver may be effected by action of counsel.”

See New York v. Hill, 528 US 110, 114 (2000).

 

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